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Introduction 
 
 
The United States, China and the 
Freedom of the Seas 
Washington’s FONOPs Conflict with Beijing 
Michael Paul 
After several years of restraint, the United States conducted its latest freedom of navi-
gation operation in the South China Sea on 22 January 2016. Three weeks later Presi-
dent Barack Obama hosted a conference of the ASEAN heads of state and government 
in California to discuss the opportunities for reducing tensions in the region, which 
is witnessing spiralling conflicts between China and its East Asian neighbours over 
island territories and their resources. Rather than contributing to a deescalation, China 
fanned the flames by stationing missile batteries on Woody Island, which is also claimed 
by Taiwan and Vietnam. Alongside that regional conflict, the South China Sea is also 
turning into an arena of conflict between Beijing and Washington. Amidst different 
interpretations of maritime law and the Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 
the question of whether the “freedom of the seas” is upheld or curtailed will have con-
siderable geopolitical and strategic military consequences. 
 
On 27 October 2015 the guided missile de-
stroyer USS Lassen (DDG-82) passed less than 
twelve nautical miles from a Chinese-built 
outpost on Subi Reef in the South China Sea. 
The reef has been occupied by China since 
1988 and forms its northernmost outpost 
in the Spratly Islands, close to the Philip-
pines. Since July 2014 the Chinese have 
transformed Subi Reef into a base measur-
ing almost four square kilometres. The 
Americans officially described their opera-
tion as a routine move in accordance with 
international law, and denied that they 
were taking sides in the competing terri-
torial claims in the South China Sea. None-
theless, this freedom of navigation opera-
tion (FONOP) was intended to demonstrate 
Washington’s determination to accept no 
restrictions on its freedom of navigation in 
this region. 
Months of controversy preceded the 
naval manoeuvre. High-ranking representa-
tives of both parties in Congress, including 
Senator John McCain, Chairman of the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, and Bob 
Corker, Chairman of the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations, had called on Secre-
tary of Defence Ashton Carter and Secretary 
of State John Kerry to respond to shifts in 
the status quo in the region. A policy of re-
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straint could be a “dangerous mistake”, said 
McCain: “If you respect the twelve-mile limit, 
then that’s de facto sovereignty, agreed to 
tacitly.” 
Washington had in fact for years ignored 
the implications of Chinese expansionism 
in the South China Sea. The USS Lassen’s pa-
trol was the first FONOP in this region since 
2012 but there was great controversy over 
what message it was actually supposed to 
convey. Subi Reef is a “low-tide elevation” 
under Article 13 of the Convention on the 
Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), generating no 
claim to territorial sea in the sense of a 
twelve-mile zone. To that extent the course 
of the US warship was no “innocent passage”, 
as that applies only in territorial waters, 
which these were not. Some argued, how-
ever, that the USS Lassen’s passage within 
twelve miles implied American recognition 
of China’s claims. That assertion is contra-
dicted by maritime law and geography, 
because Subi Reef is located close to Sand 
Cay, a small island (claimed by China, 
Taiwan, the Philippines and Vietnam) that 
does possess a twelve-mile zone. 
The passage of the USS Lassen was intended 
to underline that China’s base-building ac-
tivities had not altered the status quo con-
cerning free navigation. Consequently, the 
Americans treated the outpost erected on 
a “low-tide elevation” as an artificial island, 
which may have a safety zone but no terri-
torial waters. The patrol by the USS Curtis 
Wilbur (DDG-54) close to Triton Island in 
January 2016 was directed against “exces-
sive claims” by China and Vietnam. Here 
too, the passage occurred without the prior 
notification demanded by China and Viet-
nam. 
By ignoring artificial outposts and the 
associated claims to territorial sea, the 
United States is acting to prevent the Chi-
nese acquiring possession by default. While 
the creation of artificial islands cannot be 
undone, the claim to sovereignty, the asso-
ciated right to establish exclusive zones and 
the ensuing restriction of freedom of navi-
gation can certainly be denied. Given the 
rival territorial claims, recognition of diverse 
exclusive zones would leave the South 
China Sea looking like a Swiss cheese, 
gravely obstructing freedom of navigation 
in one of the world’s most important sea 
routes. The same would apply if China had 
its way and up to 90 percent of the South 
China Sea came under Chinese control. 
Such a development would call into ques-
tion the existing liberal order. 
Opposing Principles: 
“Mare liberum” vs. “Mare clausum” 
Under UNCLOS, the “high seas” comprise 
all waters where no coastal state exercises 
sovereign rights. That does not, however, 
give the coastal states a free hand to define 
their own territorial waters. Clear limits are 
set on the seaward extent: territorial sea is 
restricted to twelve nautical miles at most, 
the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) to no 
more than two hundred. 
Unlike China, which joined in 1996, the 
United States has never signed UNCLOS. On 
10 March 1983, President Ronald Reagan 
declared that: “the United States will recog-
nize the rights of other states in the waters 
off their coasts, as reflected in the Conven-
tion, so long as the rights and freedoms of 
the United States and others under inter-
national law are recognized by such coastal 
states.” Under its Oceans Policy, the United 
States insists on exercising global naviga-
tion and overflight rights and rejects uni-
lateral measures restricting them. 
The fundamental principle upon which 
maritime law is constructed is the “freedom 
of the seas” (mare liberum) as defined by 
Hugo Grotius, who regarded the sea as a 
common good for all humanity. By its very 
nature, he argued, the sea was open to use 
by all. John Selden, on the other hand, pro-
posed in his book published in 1635 that 
claims to exclusive rights existed in the 
sense of a “mare clausum”. It was certainly 
possible, he argued, to achieve and enforce 
state authority over parts of the seas by 
military means. 
Ultimately the principle of freedom won 
the day, as it lined up with the maritime in-
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terests of the most important European 
naval powers of the age. To this day, how-
ever, there is a counter-current, presently 
supported by China, that seeks to place 
more extensive maritime areas (and their 
resources) under the control of the coastal 
states. Such calls for a “terranisation of the 
sea” are acknowledged in UNCLOS, which 
does not exclude the possibility of change; 
the initiative for this lies with the states. 
From the US perspective, the sea, as a 
global commons, is subject to all the rights 
and liberties according to international 
law. This also applies to the “right of inno-
cent passage”: Since ancient times coastal 
states have subjected the strip of sea along 
their coasts to their own jurisdiction. But 
because all seafaring states share an inter-
est in accessing these coastal waters, both 
merchant vessels and warships enjoy the 
right of innocent passage – whether to pass 
through or to enter or leave the internal 
waters of a coastal state. The arrangement 
also avoids international shipping being 
forced to take long and potentially dan-
gerous detours. 
In this context, freedom of navigation 
means that it is permissible to pass through 
the twelve-mile zone and the two-hundred-
mile EEZ of a coastal state without obtain-
ing prior permission (UNCLOS Art. 58). The 
rules of innocent passage, under which mili-
tary activities are prohibited (submarines 
must surface and show their flag), apply 
only within territorial waters (UNCLOS 
Art. 17). That rule strongly implies that the 
right to conduct military activities such 
as exercises, manoeuvres and intelligence-
gathering in the exclusive economic zone 
is the same as on the high seas (UNCLOS 
Art. 87). 
China both interprets the rules more 
narrowly and goes beyond existing mari-
time law. It permits warships to enter the 
twelve-mile zone only with prior permis-
sion, even if the rules of innocent passage 
are observed and military activities are 
avoided. Furthermore, China also seeks to 
apply the rules of innocent passage to the 
EEZ, although under maritime law they 
apply only in territorial waters. The Chi-
nese justify this expansion on the grounds 
that the matter is not explicitly regulated 
in the Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
Other states also claim exclusive rights. 
Vietnam wishes to be informed before war-
ships enter its territorial waters. Like China 
and a string of other states (including Ma-
laysia, India, Iran and Sri Lanka), Vietnam 
believes that coastal states are entitled to 
regulate military activities in their EEZs. 
Three of these states – China, North Korea 
and Peru – have already intervened directly 
(leading in the Chinese case to incidents 
with American and Indian ships and air-
craft). Altogether the EEZs account for more 
than 30 percent of worldwide seas and 
oceans (and almost 40 percent in the Asia-
Pacific region). As well as parts of the Pacific, 
waters such as the Persian Gulf and the 
Mediterranean could be affected if coastal 
states restricted access. 
Acceptance of restricted access to for-
merly freely accessible waters would not 
only call into question existing maritime 
law based on the principle of the “freedom 
of the seas”, but also create hairline frac-
tures in the global order. Ultimately “free 
seas” cannot be taken for granted. For 
many centuries “closed” areas existed, as 
for example the Persian Gulf or the South 
China Sea could become in future. 
The US Navy has since 1945 borne the 
costs and burdens of keeping shipping 
routes open and secure in the interests of 
free trade. But that requires a correspond-
ing freedom of navigation. To that extent 
using international law to restrict freedom 
of navigation could be effective as an anti-
access/area denial tactic (A2/AD). In the 
event of an intervention to protect an ally, 
for example in East Asia or the Mediter-
ranean, the freedom of movement of air 
and sea forces would be heavily curtailed. 
This would affect shipboard sensors and 
weapons, as well as submarines which 
would no longer be permitted to enter such 
waters submerged. Ultimately such a change 
would have significant repercussions on 
the foreign and security policy of the United 
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States and its allies and on operational 
aspects of military strategy and technology. 
Freedom of Navigation Operations 
Washington reacts to the global prolifera-
tion of “excessive” maritime claims by 
actively demanding freedom of navigation. 
The FONOPs programme established in 
1979 contains a broad catalogue of meas-
ures ranging from diplomatic notes with 
the request for clarification or withdrawal 
of claims to military action. In operations 
directed explicitly against “excessive mari-
time claims”, for example, US warships pass 
through contested areas. The deliberate vio-
lation of coastal states’ claims ensures that 
they cannot acquire possession by default. 
The Pentagon’s FON report for fiscal 2014 
lists activities against nineteen countries 
including China. Issues over which Washing-
ton took action against China included 
excessive straight baselines (from which 
the limits of territorial waters and EEZs are 
calculated), jurisdiction over airspace above 
the EEZ, and restrictions on foreign air traf-
fic passing through an Air Defence Identifi-
cation Zone (ADIZ) without intent to enter 
national airspace. During the same period, 
US FONOPs also targeted Ecuador, Iran, 
Nicaragua, South Korea, Taiwan and Viet-
nam for excessive baselines. But most of 
the activities affected countries restricting 
third states within their EEZs. While the 
measures used to assert the rules during 
the past thirty-five years have been unspec-
tacular, they ultimately represent modern 
gunboat diplomacy. Operations in the 
western Pacific in connection with the Sino-
American dispute thus always also involve 
a risk of incidents at sea or in the air. 
The Commander of the US Pacific Com-
mand has announced that FON operations 
will grow in frequency, complexity, and 
scope. Indeed, one US maritime law expert 
believes that the freedom of navigation is 
currently as strongly threatened as it was 
during Imperial Germany’s unrestricted 
submarine campaign of 1915. At stake are 
not just a couple of outcrops, but elemen-
tary principles and historic claims, over 
which the United States and China dis-
agree. That is what makes it so difficult 
to resolve the disputes, or even simply to 
prevent crisis escalation. 
Given that China is sticking to its claims 
and the US Navy intends to step up its FON 
operations, latent escalation potential is the 
new normal in the South China Sea. 
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